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I. INTRODUCTION
Discriminatory pay-setting decisions can present unique chal-
lenges to both employees and employers. One of the chief problems
created by such decisions is delay: the cumulative and often secretive
nature of discriminatory pay-setting decisions can cause large lapses
of time between the decision and when employees begin to feel they
are being treated unfairly. This lapse of time can also cause unfair
prejudice to employers, who may no longer have sufficient access to
the facts and knowledge of the circumstances necessary to mount a
defense.
Facially neutral "merit-based" compensation systems can often be
subjective, leaving plenty of room for employer bias and prejudice to
manifest itself in the form of discriminatory pay-setting decisions.
One isolated discriminatory pay-setting decision made early in an em-
ployee's career may set the basis from which all subsequent non-dis-
criminatory compensation decisions are made. Therefore, one isolated
decision can continue to adversely affect an employee's compensation
for years thereafter. Particularly in the context of large institutions,
the passage of time from the initial discriminatory decision can under-
mine the ability of present employers-who may feel no discrimina-
tory animus towards the employee-to detect the past wrong.
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,1 the United States
Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that plaintiffs bringing claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 may not impute intent
1. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
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from past discriminatory pay-setting decisions in order to make the
present effects of such decisions independently actionable. 3 Ledbetter
had alleged that a series of discriminatory pay-setting decisions span-
ning her 19 year career had resulted in her being paid considerably
less than her male counterparts. 4 The Court held that pay-setting de-
cisions are properly characterized as "discrete acts" as defined by Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,5 and must therefore be
reported to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
within the statutory filing period, which is 180 days.
6
If indeed the Court in Ledbetter made a zero-sum classification of
pay setting decisions as discrete acts, it misinterpreted the subtle
command of Morgan, which was that a court should find that an act of
discrimination is discreet when an employee is capable of identifying
the conduct as discriminatory and actionable. This Note will show
the reader that, depending on the circumstances in which they arise,
pay-setting decisions may be properly characterized as either actiona-
ble "discrete acts" or "hostile work environment" claims under Mor-
gan. Part II will provide the necessary background for this assertion,
beginning with a brief overview of Title VII and then addressing the
Court's use of intent in Title VII and other areas. Part II will also
highlight the important implications of the Court's Title VII cases
leading up to Ledbetter. Part III will lay out the procedural back-
ground of Ledbetter and then set forth the holdings of the Supreme
Court, noting the arguments of both the majority and the dissent. Fi-
nally, Part IV will examine the consequences of a shift in Title VII
jurisprudence that took place after Ledbetter brought her claim, but
before the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Also in Part IV, the pre-
cise language of the holdings in Ledbetter will be contrasted with the
Court's precedent in order to determine if the door has indeed been
closed on plaintiffs who wish to bring Title VII discrimination actions
for pay-setting decisions that span careers of several years.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Employment Discrimination Law Under
Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis
of race, color, sex, religion or national origin. 7 The statute prohibits
3. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2167.
4. Id. at 2165.
5. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
6. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
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acts of intentional discrimination as well as facially neutral employ-
ment practices or actions that have a disparate impact.8 An employee
alleging a violation of Title VII must exhaust administrative remedies
before filing a suit against an employer. 9 This exhaustion-of-remedies
requirement reflects Title VII's function as a remedial measure that
"seeks to remedy discrimination through conciliation and coopera-
tion."1o To provide the necessary background for understanding the
Court's decision in Ledbetter, this section will address the Title VII
concepts of disparate impact theory, disparate treatment theory, and
discriminatory pattern-or-practice claims.
1. Disparate Impact Theory
The disparate impact theory was first recognized by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.11 Disparate impact theory ad-
dresses facially neutral employment practices that have a dispropor-
tionately adverse effect on members of protected groups,1 2 and
permits a finding of discrimination regardless of intent.13 For a plain-
tiff to prove disparate impact discrimination, it is not sufficient to
merely point to a statistical disparity in an employer's workforce. In-
stead, the plaintiff must identify the particular employment practice
that is being challenged as responsible for the alleged disparity. 1 4 The
1. to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
2. to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
8. Int'l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (explain-
ing the difference between the disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories).
9. Generally, employees have 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act has oc-
curred in which to file a charge under Title VII with the EEOC. If the employee
institutes proceedings with a state or local agency, however, the time limit for
filing is extended to 300 days. Once a charge is filed with a state or local agency,
no charge may be filed with the EEOC until 60 days have elapsed unless the state
or local agency's proceedings have been earlier terminated. After receiving a
right-to-sue letter, an employee has 90 days in which to bring suit against an
employer. See CENTER FOR EDUCATION & EMPLOYMENT LAW, FEDERAL LAWS
PROHIBITING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION at 343 (8th ed. 2004).
10. Id.
11. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
12. Id. at 430-31.
13. See id. at 432.
14. See CENTER FOR EDUCATION & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 9, at 344.
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employer must then show that a business necessity justifies the chal-
lenged practice in order to escape liability.15
2. Disparate Treatment Theory
Disparate treatment, on the other hand, refers to an employer's
actions against an individual because of the individual's membership
in a protected class and requires a showing of discriminatory intent.16
To prove intentional disparate treatment under Title VII, an employee
or applicant must first establish the minimal requirements of a prima
facie case, as set forth in the seminal disparate treatment cases Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green17 and Texas Department of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine.18 To prove a prima facie case, an employee
must show 1) that the plaintiff belongs to a protected class; 2) that he
or she applied and was qualified for the position or benefit; 3) that
despite being qualified, he or she was fired, not hired, not promoted,
etc. with respect to the position; and 4) that the position thereafter
remained open and was ultimately filled by, or the benefit conferred
to, someone outside the protected class.19 Once the court finds that
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the employer then
must rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case by producing a legitimate,
non-discriminatory explanation for the adverse employment action.
2 O
At this point in order to prevail, the employee or applicant must show
that the employer's proffered reason for the adverse action was a pre-
text for unlawful discrimination. 2 1 The Supreme Court's decision in
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks22 further refined the McDonnell
Douglass factors by holding that, because the burden of persuasion
never shifts, the plaintiff in a Title VII action must still persuade the
trier of fact that the employer acted out of an intent to discriminate,
even after showing that the employer's proffered reason was
pretextual.
2 3
15. Id.
16. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2007); Int'l
Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
17. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
18. 450 U.S. 248 (1980). The Burdine Court first reiterated the basic allocation of
evidentiary burdens announced in McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 253. Then the
Court proceeded to elaborate on the nature of the burden shifting requirements.
Id. at 253-54. The Court held that the burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all
times with the plaintiff. Id. at 256.
19. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792.
20. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
21. Id. at 256.
22. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
23. Id. at 507-09.
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3. Discriminatory Pattern-or-Practice Cases
In a pattern-or-practice case, the individual plaintiff or plaintiffs
usually allege individual disparate treatment claims, but then bring a
class action lawsuit alleging that the employer's disparate treatment
of the plaintiffs is the result of an organization-wide "pattern-or-prac-
tice" of intentionally discriminatory treatment toward members of the
plaintiffs' protected class.2 4 There are fundamental differences be-
tween pattern-or-practice cases and "other kinds of systemic discrimi-
nation such as formal policies of discrimination 25 or facially neutral
policies with discriminatory adverse impact[s] on protected groups."
26
Most notably, "[u]nlike a formal policy of discrimination or a facially
neutral policy with [a discriminatory] adverse impact on a protected
group, a pattern or practice of discrimination is an employer's
unannounced standard operating procedure of intentional
discrimination ."27
As will be further discussed in the analysis section of this Note, the
Court has declined to rule on the applicability of certain portions of its
Title VII pronouncements to pattern-or-practice cases, making this
theory potentially useful for plaintiffs whose claims may be in conflict
with the Court's recent Title VII rulings.
28
B. Relevant Supreme Court Title VII Cases Leading Up to
Ledbetter
In deciding Ledbetter, the majority drew principally from three of
the Court's previous Title VII cases: United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans,
29
24. See Vincent Cheng, Note, National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan: A
Problematic Formulation of the Continuing Violation Theory, 91 CAL. L. REV.
1417, 1432-40 (2003).
25. "A formal policy of discrimination is a facially discriminatory policy regarding
employment decisions" that the employer has explicitly announced. Id. at 1433
(citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)). In
Manhart, the Court held that an employer's formal policy of requiring women to
make larger contributions to the company benefit pension plan, since women as a
class live longer than men, violated section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, which prohibits
employers from treating an individual solely on the basis of the individual's com-
mon class characteristics such as sex and race. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711.
26. See Cheng, supra note 24, at 1433 ("A facially neutral formal policy may be un-
lawful if it is determined to have a significant adverse impact on a protected
group.") (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425 (1971)). According
to Cheng, in Griggs, an "employer was prohibited from using two [employee]
screening devices when the devices were not significantly related to job perform-
ance but operated to disqualify blacks at a substantially higher rate than whites."
Cheng, supra note 24, at 1433 n. 94.
27. Cheng, supra note 24, at 1433-34 (emphasis added).
28. See infra subsection IV.B.2.
29. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct.
2162, 2167 (2007).
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Bazemore v. Friday,30 and National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Mor-
gan.3 1 It was from these cases and their progeny 3 2 that the Court
discerned the legal principle that allegedly controlled Ledbetter. Al-
though Justice Ginsburg differed fundamentally in her interpretation
of some of the cases' implications, her dissenting opinion relied heavily
upon Evans, Bazemore, and Morgan as well, agreeing at least that
these cases controlled the issue.
3
1. United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans and the Requirement of
Present Intent in Disparate Treatment Cases
In United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans,3 4 respondent Evans, a recently
married flight attendant, had been terminated by United pursuant to
a policy that did not allow female flight attendants to be married.35
Sometime after Evans' termination, United discontinued this policy.
36
Approximately four years after Evans' initial termination, she was re-
hired as a new employee.37
Although Evans retained the same number on her personnel file
that she had been given during her previous term of employment, Ev-
ans was treated as though she had no prior service for purposes of
calculating her seniority. 38 Evans sued United for gender discrimina-
tion, claiming that her initial termination was unlawful and that the
seniority system gave "present effect to the past illegal act," thereby
perpetuating the "consequences of forbidden discrimination."
39
In rejecting Evans' claim, the Court held that "United was entitled
to treat that past act as lawful after. . . [Evans] failed to file a charge
of discrimination within the 90 days allowed by § 706(d) [of Title
VII]."40 In the decision, Justice Stevens wrote that "[a] discriminatory
act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is . . . merely an
unfortunate event in history which has no present legal conse-
quences."41 Because the seniority system was facially neutral, the
30. 478 U.s. 385 (1986). See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2172.
31. 536 U.S. 101 (2002). See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.
32. The decision also cited Lorance v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), and
Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), in support of the Court's interpreta-
tion of Evans. See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169. See also infra note 44 (summa-
rizing Ricks and Lorance).
33. See Ledbetter, 127 . Ct. at 2179-2188 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
34. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
35. Id. at 554.
36. Id. at 555.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 557.
40. Id. at 558.
41. Id. Justice Stevens, in the decision, equated the legal effects of a time-barred
discriminatory act with the legal effects of a discriminatory act that occurred
before the passage of Title VII. Id. Such an act "may constitute relevant back-
20081
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past discriminatory act, and not the present application of the senior-
ity system was joined with the requisite intent to discriminate.
a. The Court's Treatment of Intent in Discrimination Cases
Evans is also significant because it illustrates the starting point of
the Court's approach to the intent requirement in Title VII cases. In
the past, the Court had entertained the idea of interpreting anti-dis-
crimination laws as capable of providing remedies to wronged plain-
tiffs even in the absence of clearly culpable institutional decision-
making.42 Evans provides an example of how the Court began to alter
its course 43 in a number of significant cases 4 4 by "adjudicat[ing] in a
language of individualism [that] ... imputes both motive and intent to
institutions like police departments and corporations." 4 5
Claims of discrimination brought against institutions often present
unique conceptual challenges to appropriating blame.46 In the context
of large-scale industries and governmental bureaucracies, wrongs that
are recognizable as such may arise without a single, clearly blamewor-
thy individual at which to point the finger.47 Nevertheless, while the
ground evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at
issue," but the past act of discrimination has no present legal effect. Id.
42. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (focusing analysis on
Title VII's remedial mandate and downplaying the significance of the employer's
motive).
43. See Denise G. R6aume, Harm and Fault in Discrimination Law: The Transition
from Intentional to Adverse Effect Discrimination, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
349, 350 (2001) ("[Alithough the American courts led the way in introducing the
adverse effect or disparate impact idea, they have since confined its application to
a relatively narrow set of cases, reverting elsewhere to a narrow intention-based
test of liability.").
44. In addition to Evans, see Lorance v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911 (1989)
(holding that charging period began when new seniority system was adopted, not
when its discriminatory effects were felt) and Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250, 257 (1980) (holding that statute of limitations periods commenced to run at
the time when college professor was denied tenure, not at the time he was dis-
charged one year later). Non-Title VII examples include Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976) (holding that discriminatory motive is a necessary ele-
ment of constitutional employment discrimination actions challenging govern-
ment employers), and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 188-89
(1989) (holding that the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is limited to discrimination at
the time of contract formation, and that the statute does not proscribe racial dis-
crimination in all aspects of contractual relations).
45. Rosa Eckstein, Comment, Towards a Communitarian Theory of Responsibility:
Bearing the Burden for the Unintended, 45 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 843, 848-49 (1991).
46. See discussion infra note 51.
47. See Ruth Gana Okediji, Status Rules: Doctrine as Discrimination in a Post-Hicks
Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 49, 71 (1998) ("Discrimination can be a pas-
sive moral state that exists in the heart without any conscious awareness of its
existence or how or when it may manifest in specific acts, speech or decisions.").
See also Eckstein, supra note 45, at 849 (holding that in an institutional context
such as the workplace, "injury can stem from corruption and inertia, independent
[Vol. 86:955
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Civil Rights Act of 199148 made it clear that evidence of the intent to
discriminate is not essential to prove a disparate impact claim, 4 9 in-
tent has remained a crucial element of disparate treatment claims.
50
Evans is illustrative of how the Court begins its disparate treatment
analysis from the standpoint of the individual motive of the
employer.
5 1
of motive") (citing David M. Phillips, An Essay: Six Competing Currents of Rule
10b-5 Jurisprudence, 21 IND. L. REV. 624, 642 n.95 (1988)).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000).
49. Id. ("For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs ...
when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the
seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the
seniority system or provision of the system.").
50. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2007) (citing
Chadron v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam); Teamsters v. U.S., 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
1002 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[A] disparate-treatment challenge fo-
cuses exclusively on the intent of the employer.")).
51. Because the functions of complex organizations are rarely attributable to the will
or intent of a single person, it is perhaps not surprising that the requirement of
present intent to prove discrimination has come under significant scholarly at-
tack. See, for example, Eckstein, supra note 45, in which the author observes a
Rawlsian liberalism driving the Court's intent jurisprudence. Id. at 889-92. Pro-
fessor Eckstein identified liberalism as "a deontological ethic, which emphasizes
individual rights and duties that override public concerns and collective ends."
Id. at 884 n.6. Professor Eckstein then made the following observations (over the
course of five pages) regarding the compatibility of liberalistic formulations of
intent with the realities of institutional harms:
The Court perceives institutions as the sum of their individual parts, as
collections of autonomous beings, who, according to the liberal ethic, are
mutually disinterested and owe very little to one another. . . . [T]he
Court's approach is impoverished because it ignores important aspects of
our social lives .... The centrality of individual motive in the Court's
jurisprudence is a reflection of an emphasis on the private, on individu-
alism, and on autonomy. A liberal vision presumes that individuals are
responsible primarily for themselves and their intentions, not the sys-
temic problems of their institutions .... [I]n the context of institutions,
like the workplace, the municipality, and the market, an emphasis on
individualism is at best incomplete, because institutions exhibit struc-
tural problems unattributable to individual motive, problems to which
the Court's narrow vision of responsibility does not speak.... In its anal-
ysis of discrimination and corruption, the Court treats institutions as if
they were human beings .... Corporations and municipalities cannot
think, feel, and intend like people. However, because the Court adjudi-
cates in a language of individualism, it distorts institutional behav-
ior . . . . Thus, the Court arrives at very narrow definitions of
responsibility, imputing liability only when an injury was consciously
chosen by a personified or individualized defendant.
Id. at 845, 847-49.
Professor Eckstein's essay was published in 1991-the same year that Con-
gress amended Title VII to codify the disparate impact theory recognized in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in which intent was held not to be
an essential element. Thus, to the extent Eckstein is referring to the motive or
intent requirement that had begun to make its way into the Court's disparate
20081
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An exhaustive discussion of the well-documented and extensively
analyzed conceptual shortcomings of the Court's treatment of intent in
its discrimination jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Note. Yet
the Court's treatment of intent in Evans hints at the inevitability of
the Court's result in Ledbetter. Ledbetter's failure to anticipate the
Court's retreat away from structural discrimination claims and to-
wards the requirement of a morally culpable individual wrongdoer
would prove to be a fatal oversight.
2. Bazemore v. Friday and Discriminatory Pay Structures
The principle announced in Evans, that Title VII was powerless to
address compensation systems that give present effect to past acts of
discrimination, was rendered uncertain by the Court in Bazemore v.
Friday.5 2 Bazemore involved the claims of black workers that had
been subjected to segregated services and pay structures prior to the
enactment of Title VII.53 After the statute became law, the employer
desegregated in 1965.54 The plaintiffs in Bazemore claimed that the
salary disparities continued on afterwards. 55 The Supreme Court
held in a per curiam opinion that the employer was under an affirma-
tive obligation to eradicate the pay disparities that had taken hold in
the pre-Title VII era. 56
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion in Bazemore that was
joined by all other Justices in part.57 Characterizing the error of the
Fourth Circuit as "too obvious to warrant extended discussion"58 the
Court held that the fact that the employer discriminated with respect
to salaries prior to the time it was covered by Title VII did not excuse
continued discrimination after the employer had become subject to the
statute.5 9 In declaring that Bazemore's holding was consistent with
the Court's prior Title VII cases, the Court explained that the critical
question in Evans had been whether any present violation existed.
60
impact jurisprudence via cases such as Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989), her concerns may have been allayed. The same problems of in-
stitutional intent can arise in disparate treatment cases, however, as was argua-
bly the case in Ledbetter. In such instances, it is not the system itself that causes
the harm, but rather the collective judgments and beliefs of decision makers
charged with employing the system that over time may evince a discriminatory
treatment of an employee, even in the absence of a specific intent to discriminate.
52. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
53. Id. at 390 (Brennan, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 390-91.
55. Id. at 391.
56. Id. at 397.
57. Id. at 389.
58. Id. at 395.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 396 n.6.
[Vol. 86:955
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The Court concluded that the present violation in Bazemore was the
continuing application of the discriminatory pay structure.
6 1
The Court thus held that under a discriminatory pay structure,
"[elach week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a simi-
larly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless
of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of
Title VII."62 In light of this determination, the Court held that the
employer had an obligation to eliminate the pre-Act discriminatory
pay differences. As will be discussed in Part III, both the parties and
the Court in Ledbetter would dispute the effect that Bazemore had on
the Court's analysis of intent in Title VII disparate pay cases.
3. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan and the
Constraining of the Continuing Violations Theory
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in National Railroad Pas-
senger Corp. v. Morgan6 3 due to a lack of uniformity among circuits in
applying a Title VII theory known as the "continuing violation" the-
ory.6 4 The continuing violation theory is a procedural theory that was
widely used prior to Morgan that provided an exception to the statute
of limitations in Title VII cases. The Court explained that this "theory
allows courts to toll or extend the limitations period so that plaintiffs
may recover in part based on defendants' discriminatory conduct oc-
curring before that period."65 The results in Morgan changed the way
courts may apply the continuing violation theory by dividing the world
of disparate treatment into two distinct parts. 66 Plaintiffs bringing
disparate treatment claims after Morgan must now choose between
seeking recovery for "discrete acts" of discrimination or recovery for a
single "hostile work environment" claim comprised of several compo-
nent discriminatory acts. 6 7
61. Id. at 397 n.6 ("Our holding in no sense gives legal effect to the pre-1972 actions,
but, consistent with Evans .. . focuses on the present salary structure, which is
illegal if it is a mere continuation of the pre-1965 discriminatory pay structure.").
62. Id. at 395.
63. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
64. See Cheng, supra note 24, at 1421-22, noting:
Prior to National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, where the Su-
preme Court addressed for the first time the scope and application of the
continuing violation theory, the Court's employment discrimination law
jurisprudence not only provided scant guidance on, but also caused con-
fusion about, the procedural theory. The paucity and inadequacy ofjudi-
cial guidance from the Supreme Court contributed to divergent
interpretations of the procedural theory among the courts of appeals.
65. Cheng, supra note 24, at 1420.
66. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.
67. See id.
20081
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In Morgan, a black man sued National Railroad Passenger Corp.
68
in federal district court alleging that throughout his employment with
Amtrak he had been subjected to discriminatory and retaliatory acts
and had endured a racially hostile work environment.6 9 The Ninth
Circuit held that Morgan had alleged pre-limitations and post-limita-
tions violations that were sufficiently related to invoke the continuing
violation theory.
70
In an opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court deliv-
ered a blow to the continuing violation theory by holding that discrete
discriminatory and retaliatory acts that fall outside of Title VII's stat-
ute of limitations are forever time-barred. 7 1 The continuing violation
theory was allowed to live on, however, in the context of hostile work
environment claims.72 A divided Court held that because such claims
allege a series of incidents, some of which may be difficult to identify
and are not independently actionable, such claims collectively formed
a single allegation of an offensive or intimidating atmosphere.
7 3
In distinguishing between actions that are discrete and actions
that make up a hostile work environment, the Court noted that Title
VII "explains in great detail the sorts of actions that qualify as
'[u]nlawful employment practices' and includes among such practices
numerous discrete acts."74 Justice Thomas offered "[d]iscrete acts
such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal
to hire" as examples of employment actions that are "easy to iden-
68. The National Railroad Passenger Corp. is otherwise known as Amtrak.
69. Morgan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1010-13 (9th Cir. 2000).
70. Id. at 1017-18. The Ninth Circuit identified two ways in which a continuing vio-
lation theory could be established: serial violations and systemic violations. The
court explained that "[a] serial violation is established if the evidence indicates
that the alleged acts of discrimination occurring prior to the limitations period
are sufficiently related to those occurring within the limitations period." Id. at
1015. "Systemic violations involve 'demonstrating a company wide policy or prac-
tice' and most often occur in matters of placement or promotion." Id. at 1016
(quoting Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472,
1480 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Ninth Circuit concluded that when the pre-limitations
events were viewed in the context of the totality of Morgan's relationship with
Amtrak, they constituted part of a series or pattern of discrimination, retaliation,
and hostile environment. Id. at 1017.
71. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
72. See id. at 115-17.
73. Id. at 114.
74. Id. at 111 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000)). In support of this statement, Jus-
tice Thomas noted the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
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tify"7 5 and therefore must be charged within either 180 or 30076 days
of when they "occur."77 By contrast, the individual acts that make up
a hostile work environment claim are harder to identify, and are thus
viewed collectively as component parts of a single violation.
78 Compo-
nent incidents occurring outside of the charging period may be consid-
ered for purposes of liability in hostile work environment claims.
79
Still, to bring a timely hostile work environment claim, at least one of
the component acts must have occurred within the charging period.8 0
Morgan was the Court's attempt to identify conclusively the cir-
cumstances under which a court may look to discriminatory acts oc-
curring prior to the EEOC charging period for purposes of assigning
liability. The facts and procedural background of Ledbetter, however,
highlight the latent ambiguities lurking within the holdings of
Morgan.
C. Between Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,8l the Court deter-
mined that Evans, Bazemore, and Morgan define the contours of dis-
parate treatment theory.8 2 Some commentators have argued that the
Court's treatment of disparate impact and disparate treatment has
constrained the two theories' respective abilities to reach certain types
of discrimination.8 3 Disparate impact theory may assuage the hard-
ships of proving intent, but as a theory it presents its own problems of
proving disproportionately adverse impacts brought about by the
75. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
76. See discussion supra note 9.
77. In a footnote, Thomas cited two definitions of "occur": "WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1561 (1993), defines 'occur' as 'to present itself: to
come to pass: take place: HAPPEN.' See also BLAC's LAw DICTIONARY 1080 (6th
ed. 1990) (defining '[o]ccur' as '[t]o happen;.., to take place; to arise')." Morgan,
536 U.S. at 110 n.5.
78. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
79. Id. at 117.
80. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117. The decision explained:
It does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that some of the compo-
nent acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time
period. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the
filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be
considered by a court for purposes of determining liability.
Id.
81. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
82. See supra section II.B.
83. See Joseph A Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment:
Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 95, 98 (2006). In the
article, Seiner critiqued the current tendency of U.S. courts to treat disparate
impact and disparate treatment claims as "analytically distinct." Id. He also
noted that "[p]laintiffs have lost viable claims of unintentional discrimination by
failing to separately plead a disparate impact theory." Id.
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facially neutral practices themselves. Conversely, claims of disparate
treatment will only lie when a discriminatory employment practice is
linked with a specific intent to discriminate.8 4 Untouched are acts of
discrimination that, while not attributable to any particular practice
itself, reflect the unintended biases and stereotypes that manifest
themselves over time.8 5 Also beyond reach are the lingering discrimi-
natory effects of time-barred acts of intentional discrimination.
8 6
Such scenarios may be thought of not as discriminatory acts but
rather as discriminatory situations existing somewhere in the gray
area between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims.
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.87 provided the Court with
an opportunity to allow Title VII to expand its remedial potential by
reaching into this gray area. Lilly Ledbetter's challenge was to navi-
gate the "blurry legal landscape of disparate impact and disparate
treatment cases"8 8 and proceed in such a way as would allow the
Court to redress the gross disparities between her salary and those of
her male counterparts without disturbing settled precedents. Ledbet-
ter chose to proceed on a theory that would require the Court to either
impute intent from discriminatory decisions made outside of the limi-
tations period, or hold that intent was not an essential element when
the effects are felt within the charging period.8 9
84. See discussion supra Part II.B.l.a.
85. As one commentator noted:
[T]he comment, "I see why they used blacks as slaves-they are so
strong," made by a friend while I was lifting a suitcase may not indicate
intent in the conscious sense. However, there is certainly a manifesta-
tion of discrimination if I am later asked to lift the heaviest of several
cases because "I am the strongest." ... There is no doubt in my mind
that my friend did not intend to offend me, but she nevertheless made a
judgment about my ability based on nothing more than my race. The
assignment of tasks based on her belief would be useful as evidence of
discrimination only because she had verbally expressed herself earlier,
and so the causal element by law could have been established. Assume
she assigned tasks with this in mind but made no comment, or made a
comment but no act reflecting her conviction-discrimination, albeit un-
intended, still exists. Yet, under the framework for proving discrimina-
tion, the case in the last two scenarios would have been difficult, if not
impossible, to establish.
Okediji supra note 47, at 71-72.
86. The Court refers to such discriminatory acts which are not made the basis for
timely charges as "merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present
legal consequences." Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2168 (quoting United Airlines, Inc.
v. Evans 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977)). See also id. at 2178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("Any annual pay decision not contested immediately (within 180 days), the
Court affirms, becomes grandfathered, a fait accompli beyond the province of Ti-
tle VII ever to repair.").
87. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
88. Seiner, supra note 83 at 97.
89. In her petition for certiorari, Ledbetter presented the following question to the
Court:
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III. LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER CO., INC.
In many respects, the Court's treatment of Title VII in Evans,
Bazemore, and Morgan created more questions than it answered. Va-
rious courts of appeals and the EEOC were interpreting Bazemore in
ways that appeared contradictory to the holdings of Evans.90 The
Morgan Court declined to comment on the applicability of its "discrete
act" rule to pattern-or-practice cases, 9 1 and did not make clear
whether employment actions denominated "discrete" in one context
could still be considered component acts of a hostile work environment
claim in another context. Ledbetter provided the Court with the op-
portunity to address some of these questions.
A. Facts, Holdings, and Procedural Background of Ledbetter
v. Goodyear
Lilly Ledbetter worked at the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
from 1979 to 1998, first as a supervisor and subsequently as an area
manager. 92 Ledbetter began her employment at the same salary as
male supervisors, but over the course of her career, several managers
made annual pay setting decisions that eventually made Ledbetter
the lowest paid area manager. 93 Near the end of her career, Ledbetter
was the only woman working as an area manager and was making
$559 less per month than the lowest paid male area manager.
94
In 1998, Ledbetter went to the EEOC and filed a questionnaire in
March and a formal charge of discrimination in July, alleging that she
had received a discriminatorily low salary as an area manager be-
cause of her sex.95 In August, Ledbetter accepted an offer of early
retirement in the face of massive lay-offs, and retired effective Novem-
ber 1, 1998.96
Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay dis-
crimination when the disparate pay is received during the statutory lim-
itations period, but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay
decisions that occurred outside the limitations period.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127
S. Ct. 2162 (2007) (No. 05-1074), 2006 WL 448515.
90. See supra note 44; see infra notes 135, 136.
91. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 115 n.9 (2002).
92. Brief of Respondent at 1, Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007) (No. 05-1074), 2006
WL 3014119. See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. At the end of 1997, Ledbetter was receiving $3,727 per month. Id. at 2178. Of
her 15 male area manager counterparts, the lowest paid male received $4,286 per
month and the highest paid male manager received $5,236. Id.
95. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005).
96. Id.
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In February 1999, Ledbetter filed a lawsuit against Goodyear and
alleged, among other claims,9 7 a Title VII pay discrimination claim
and a claim under the Equal Pay Act of 1963.98 On several of Ledbet-
ter's claims, including her Equal Pay Act claim, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Goodyear. Ledbetter's Title
VII pay discrimination claim, however, was allowed to proceed to trial.
At trial, Ledbetter introduced evidence that some of her past supervi-
sors had given her poor evaluations because of her sex and that the
discriminatory evaluations resulted in smaller pay increases for Led-
better than for her male counterparts. 9 9 Ledbetter asserted that the
discriminatory pay setting decisions continued to affect her salary
throughout her employment and were responsible for the considerable
disparity between Ledbetter's salary and the salaries of male area
managers at the time of her retirement.10 0 At the close of evidence at
trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of
Goodyear on several of Ledbetter's remaining claims, but allowed the
disparate pay claim to go to the jury. The jury found that Goodyear
had discriminated against Ledbetter in this regard.1O1
On appeal, Goodyear argued that the statute of limitations barred
all claims of discrimination based on pay decisions made 180 days or
more prior to the filing of Ledbetter's EEOC questionnaire.1 0 2 Good-
year further argued that no discriminatory act relating to Ledbetter's
pay occurred after that date. 10 3 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, holding:
[Alt least in cases in which the employer has a system for periodically review-
ing and re-establishing employee pay, an employee seeking to establish that
his or her pay level was unlawfully depressed may look no further into the
past than the last affirmative decision directly affecting the employee's pay
immediately preceding the start of the limitations period.
10 4
The Eleventh Circuit then held that there was not legally sufficient
evidence to support a claim of intentional discrimination in the 1997
and 1998 pay setting decisions, which were the only two decisions to
occur within the above-mentioned period.' 0 5 Because Ledbetter did
not present the trial court with evidence sufficient to permit a reason-
able jury to find that the 1997 and 1998 pay decisions were discrimi-
natory, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court should
97. Id. at 1175 n.7 ("Ledbetter's complaint presented multiple claims of age discrimi-
nation, sex discrimination, and retaliation in violation of Title VII ... the Equal
Pay Act ... and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.. ").
98. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000). The Equal Pay Act prohibits paying unequal wages for
equal work because of sex, and was enacted contemporaneously with Title VII.
99. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165-66.
100. See id.
101. See infra note 112.
102. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166.
103. Id.
104. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1183.
105. Id. at 1189-90.
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have granted Goodyear judgment as a matter of law, and therefore
reversed.1 0
6
B. The United States Supreme Court Decision
The Court granted certiorari in Ledbetter due to the lack of agree-
ment among the courts of appeals as to the proper application of the
limitations period in Title VII disparate pay cases. 10 7 In her petition
for writ of certiorari, Ledbetter did not seek or obtain review of the
Eleventh Circuit's finding that there was insufficient evidence of in-
tentional discrimination during the charging period.l0 8 Instead, Led-
better presented the following question for review:
Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination
when the disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period,
but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred
outside the limitations period. 1 0 9
As an initial matter, it is significant that Ledbetter chose to bring
her complaint under a disparate treatment theory. 1 10 While styling
her claim as one of disparate impact might have avoided Ledbetter's
problems of having to prove present intent, there were several practi-
cal obstacles that likely precluded her from doing so. Goodyear's per-
formance-based pay system appeared facially neutral and
unsusceptible to claims that it adversely affected members of pro-
tected groups."' In addition, "[tihe lack of a clear, uniform theoreti-
cal basis for disparate impact in the United States has left courts
106. Id.
107. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166 (comparing the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Ledbet-
ter with Forsyth v. Fed'n Employment & Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565 (2d Cir.
2005) and Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
108. Brief of Respondent, supra note 92, at 11; See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166.
109. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166 (citation omitted).
110. See id. at 2167 ("Ledbetter asserted disparate treatment, the central element of
which is discriminatory intent.").
111. Id. at 2174.
In 1982, Goodyear implemented a merit-based compensation program.
Under the "Pay for Performance" program, each "Business Center Man-
ager" within a plant became responsible for determining annual merit
increases for the salaried employees under his or her supervision. In
doing so, the Business Center Manager was required to take each em-
ployee's existing salary at the time as a given starting point; the man-
ager was to focus only on appropriate salary increases. In that regard,
the manager was also to take into account each employee's performance
ranking for the year; where the employee's existing salary stood within
the salary range for his or her position; and the amount and timing of
the employee's most recent increase. Each employee's annual increase
could not exceed a specified maximum percentage, and the total amount
of increases awarded in each Business Center could not exceed a set
budget.
Brief of Respondent, supra note 92, at 1-2, (citations omitted).
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confused and often unwilling to accept such claims."112 Perhaps most
importantly, compensatory and punitive damages are available only
for claims brought under a disparate treatment theory, not a dispa-
rate impact theory.
1 13
Ledbetter was not successful in her attempt to prove a disparate
treatment claim because she could not show that her employer had
made a discriminatory decision paired with discriminatory intent
within the statute of limitations. In the opening paragraph of the ma-
jority opinion, Justice Alito, stated flatly that a pay-setting decision is
a discrete act that occurs at a particular point in time. 114 Citing Mor-
gan, the Court concluded that because pay-setting decisions are dis-
crete acts, the time for filing a charge with the EEOC begins to run as
soon as the employer makes the discriminatory decision. 1 15 Because
the pay-setting decisions alleged by Ledbetter as discriminatory oc-
curred outside of the limitations period, the majority affirmed the
Eleventh Circuit's reversal of Ledbetter's disparate pay victory.
116
Thus, Ledbetter's disparate treatment claim was doomed to failure be-
cause the Court refused to consider the employer's intent outside of
the statutory period.
The decision identified intent as the "defining element"117 of dispa-
rate treatment challenges and asserted that in United Airlines Inc. v.
Evans,118 the Court had rejected an argument that was "basically the
same" as Ledbetter's.119 Relying on Evans' conclusion that the contin-
uing effects of discriminatory acts that take place in the pre-charging
period cannot make out a present violation, Justice Alito's majority
opinion echoed Justice Stevens' characterization of such acts as
"merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal
consequences."120 The majority cited Delaware State College v.
Ricks 12 1 and Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.122 in support of
112. Seiner, supra note 83, at 97 (footnote omitted).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2000) (allowing for compensatory and punitive damages
to be sought against an employer 'who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimi-
nation (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate im-
pact)"). At trial, the jury awarded Ledbetter $223,776 in back pay, $4,662 in
damages for mental anguish, and $3,285,976 in punitive damages. The trial
court remitted the award to $360,000, including $300,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages and $60,000 in back pay. Brief of Respondent, supra note 92,
at 6-7.
114. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2166-67.
118. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
119. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2167.
120. Id. at 2168 (quoting Evans, 431 U.S. at 558).
121. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
122. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
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Evans' requirement of a present intent to discriminate during the
charging period. 12
3
The majority then turned its focus to Morgan, where the Court ex-
plained that Title VII's use of the term "employment practice"124 gen-
erally refers to a discrete act or single "occurrence" that takes place at
a particular time.12 5 After noting that the opinion in Morgan had
pointed to acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of
transfer, and refusal to hire as examples of discrete acts, Alito con-
cluded that Ledbetter had alleged discrete discriminatory pay-setting
acts that needed to be challenged within the EEOC charging
period.126
Noting that "[a] disparate-treatment claim comprises two ele-
ments: an employment practice, and discriminatory intent,"12 7 the
majority concluded that to shift the motive of the time-barred act to a
later act performed without discriminatory bias would impose liability
in the absence of the requisite intent, and would distort Title VII's
"integrated multistep enforcement procedure."128
The majority rejected Ledbetter's reliance on the Court's decision
in Bazemore for the proposition that decisions relating to pay are dif-
ferent. Ledbetter had argued that Bazemore "necessarily decided the
central question presented here: in a disparate pay case, '[w]hat con-
stitutes an 'unlawful employment practice' and when has that practice
'occurred'?"' 12 9 According to Ledbetter, the Court in Bazemore had
"conclude[ed] that the present execution of a past discriminatory pay
decision was itself a present and independent violation of Title
VII."130 Ledbetter attempted to focus the Court's attention on what
she believed to be the pivotal statement of the holding in Bazemore,
namely that "[e] ach week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than
to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII,
regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the effective
123. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2168.
124. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
Section 2000e-2(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
125. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169 (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101, 110 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2171.
128. Id. 2170 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359
(1977)).
129. Reply Brief of Petitioner, at 3-4, Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (No. 05-1074), 2006
WL 3336479 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113).
130. Id. at 4.
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date of Title VII."13 1 The dissent 13 2 agreed with Ledbetter and stated
the following: "Paychecks perpetuating past discrimination, we thus
recognized [in Bazemore], are actionable not simply because they are
'related' to a decision made outside the charge-filing period, but be-
cause they discriminate anew each time they issue."13 3
Goodyear argued that the United States
did not claim in Bazemore that unlawful pay discrimination could be estab-
lished wholly by reference to allegedly discriminatory acts occurring outside of
an applicable limitations period .... Rather, the United States asserted in
Bazemore that the challenged pay practices reflected ongoing intentional dis-
crimination by the Extension Service itself.134
In response, Ledbetter claimed that there was no mention of a re-
quirement of present intent in Bazemore and that Goodyear was inap-
propriately attempting to read a missing piece into the decision.
135
The question thus became whether Bazemore recognized a require-
ment of a present intent to discriminate at the time the unlawful em-
ployment practice allegedly occurred and, if so, where in Bazemore
this requirement could be found. It is worth noting that Ledbetter
was far from alone in her interpretation of the meaning of Bazemore.
As noted by the dissent, most of the courts of appeals had adopted a
similar interpretation,136 and "the EEOC-the federal agency respon-
131. Id. (quoting Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96) (1986)).
132. Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer were the dissenting judges. Ledbetter, 127 S.
Ct. at 2178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2180 (citation omitted).
134. Brief of Respondent, supra note 92, at 28.
135. See Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 129, at 4, stating:
Respondent asserts that the Court's explanation of its holding and ratio-
nale in Bazemore was incomplete, and that the Court really relied on an
additional fact never explicitly mentioned in the opinion itself: that the
Extension Service made a conscious decision, at some point after the ef-
fective date of the Act, to maintain the prior disparate pay levels for the
purpose of discrimination against its black employees.
Id. (citation omitted).
136. As Justice Ginsburg noted:
[Tlhe [clourts of [aippeals have overwhelmingly judged as a present vio-
lation the payment of wages infected by discrimination: Each paycheck
less than the amount payable had the employer adhered to a nondis-
criminatory compensation regime, courts have held, constitutes a cogni-
zable harm. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Federation Employment and Guidance
Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Any paycheck given within the
[charge-filing] period... would be actionable, even if based on a discrim-
inatory pay scale set up outside of the statutory period."); Shea v. Rice,
409 F.3d 448, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[An] employer commit[s] a sepa-
rate unlawful employment practice each time he pa[ys] one employee
less than another for a discriminatory reason" (citing Bazemore, 478 U.S.
at 396); Goodwin v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1009-10 (10th
Cir. 2002) ("[Bazemore] has taught a crucial distinction with respect to
discriminatory disparities in pay, establishing that a discriminatory sal-
ary is not merely a lingering effect of past discrimination-instead it is
itself a continually recurring violation .... [E]ach race-based discrimi-
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sible for enforcing Title VII-has interpreted the Act to permit em-
ployees to challenge disparate pay each time it is received."
13 7
According to the majority, where Ledbetter, the EEOC, and vari-
ous courts of appeals erred in their interpretation of Bazemore was in
their reliance on some admittedly confusing language taken from Jus-
tice Brennan's concurrence, 138 as well as their failure to heed Justice
Brennan's own admonition that Bazemore was not inconsistent with,
and therefore should be read in light of, prior Title VII cases in which
the Court had held that time-barred acts of discrimination did not con-
stitute a present violation when their effects are later felt.1
39
Distinguishing the facts of Bazemore from those alleged by Ledbet-
ter, the majority asserted that the defendants in Bazemore had
adopted and intentionally retained a facially discriminatory pay struc-
ture.140 It was thus held that Bazemore stands for the proposition
that an employer violates Title VII and triggers a new EEOC charging
period whenever the employer issues paychecks using a discrimina-
tory pay structure.1 4 1 This understanding of Bazemore, the majority
assured, was consistent with the Court's prior precedents.' 4 2 Justice
Alito concluded his analysis by declaring that "[b]ecause Ledbetter
has not adduced evidence that Goodyear initially adopted its perform-
ance based pay system in order to discriminate on the basis of sex or
natory salary payment constitutes a fresh violation of Title VII." (foot-
note omitted)); Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
("The [clourts of [aippeals have repeatedly reached the . . conclusion"
that pay discrimination is "actionable upon receipt of each paycheck.");
accord Hildenbrandt v. Illinois Dept. of Natural Resources, 347 F.3d
1014, 1025-29 (7th Cir. 2003); Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 257
(3d Cir. 2001); Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164,
167-68 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc.,
36 F.3d 336, 347-49 (4th Cir. 1994); Gibbs v. Pierce County Law En-
forcement Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1986).
Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2184-85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2185 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f), 2000e-12(a) (2000), and noting that
"The EEOC's Compliance Manual provides that 'repeated occurrences of the
same discriminatory employment action, such as discriminatory paychecks, can
be challenged as long as one discriminatory act occurred within the charge filling
period'") (citation omitted). Justice Ginsburg went on to list a series of EEOC
administrative decisions applying the agency's interpretation of Bazemore. Id.
138. Justice Brennan's infamous declaration in Bazemore that "[e]ach week's
paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a
wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this pattern was
begun prior to the effective date of Title VII" is particularly susceptible to misin-
terpretation when read in a vacuum, and was the focus of much of the confusion
in the lower courts. See supra note 135.
139. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 396 n.6.
140. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2173 (emphasis added). As mentioned, the pay system
itself in Ledbetter was not under attack. See supra note 111.
141. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2173-74.
142. Id. at 2173.
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that it later applied this system to her within the charging period with
any discriminatory animus, Bazemore is of no help to her."1
4 3
In a final and comparatively small portion of the opinion, the ma-
jority briefly addressed Ledbetter's reliance on "analogies to other
statutory regimes and on extra-statutory policy arguments." 14 4 Led-
better had pointed out that under the Equal Pay Act,14 5 it was com-
mon for lower courts to hear claims that challenged pay disparities
that originated outside of the limitations period.146 Ledbetter also
referenced the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,147 noting that for
purposes of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of that stat-
ute, the limitations period begins to run anew whenever a paycheck is
issued. 148 With scant analysis, the Court found the functions of the
Equal Pay Act and the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act distinguishable from Title VII largely due to the absence of
a requirement of present discriminatory intent in either the EPA or
the FLSA.149 The Court did concede that cases arising under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act were analogous to Title VII cases,150 but
concluded that the NLRA cases supported, rather than contradicted,
the majority's result in Ledbetter. The Court cited Local Lodge No.
1424, International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB151 for the proposition
that, under the NLRA, unfair labor practices occurring before the
charging period are not actionable, but rather provide relevant back-
ground evidence for timely charges. 15 2 With regard to the reasons
outlined by Ledbetter for treating pay-setting decisions differently,
the Court concluded that it was "not in a position to evaluate Ledbet-
ter's policy arguments." Justice Alito declared that such arguments
143. Id. at 2174.
144. Id. at 2176.
145. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000). The EPA was enacted at the same time as Title VII,
and prohibits unequal wages for equal work because of sex.
146. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2176.
147. See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2000).
148. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2176.
149. Although Ledbetter had argued that lower courts hear EPA claims that address
pay disparities that first arose outside of the limitations period, the majority
found the EPA distinguishable because the statute "does not require the filing of
a charge with the EEOC or proof of intentional discrimination." Ledbetter, 127 S.
Ct. at 2176. The majority dismissed Ledbetter's reliance on the FLSA for the
same reasons. Id.
150. In Justice Alito's words,
Ledbetter is on firmer ground in suggesting that we look to cases arising
under the [NLRA] since the NLRA provided a model for Title VII's reme-
dial provisions and, like Title VII, requires the filing of a timely adminis-
trative charge (with the National Labor Relations Board) before suit
may be maintained.
Id. at 2177 (citing Lorance v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 909 (1989); Ford
Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 226 n.8 (1982)).
151. 362 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1960).
152. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2177.
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"find no support in the statute" and that the Court would "apply the
statute as written."
153
The dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, made a compelling argument that pay
setting decisions are different from discrete acts such as failure to hire
and failure to promote. 154 The dissent agreed with Ledbetter's asser-
tion that the Court in Bazemore had recognized the unique nature of
disparate pay cases and had therefore treated them differently.
15 5
Justice Ginsburg drew support for this conclusion from the fact that
the EEOC and many of the courts of appeals had held that paychecks
that reflect discrimination violate Title VII anew each time they
issue. 156
The dissent also relied on Morgan for the proposition that pay-set-
ting decisions are more like hostile work environment claims than dis-
crete act claims because the adverse pay decisions can be hard to
identify and the plaintiff may initially consider them insignificant and
not immediately actionable. 15 7 In defending their understanding of
Bazemore and Morgan, the dissent characterized the majority's con-
cern for employers who face liability for past acts as unfounded, noting
that equitable doctrines such as laches and estoppel would preclude
employees from bringing suits that would unfairly prejudice
employers. 158
IV. ANALYSIS
Ledbetter's case hinged on the Court's willingness to recognize a
timely-charged act of intentional discrimination. Because Ledbetter
could not impute the intent of past acts, she had no timely acts of in-
tentional discrimination that could bring her case within the purview
of Title VII under either available theory.159 As such, the Court had
no occasion to decide whether pay-setting decisions are more properly
characterized as "discrete acts" or "hostile environment" claims. It did
so anyway.
If indeed the Court in Ledbetter made a zero-sum classification of
pay setting decisions as discrete acts, it misinterpreted the subtle
command of Morgan. Depending on the circumstances in which they
arise, pay-setting decisions may be properly characterized as actiona-
ble "discrete acts" or "hostile environment" claims.
153. Id. at 2177.
154. Id. at 2180-81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See infra note 165.
155. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2179-81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 2184-85. See supra notes 135-36.
157. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181-82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 2186.
159. See supra subsection II.B.3 (discussing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101 (2002)).
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A. Pay Setting Decisions: Discrete Acts or Repeated
Conduct?
The landscape of Title VII disparate impact claims changed signifi-
cantly from the time Lilly Ledbetter first brought her suit in federal
district court in November 1999160 to the time the Supreme Court
decided her case in May 2007. When Ledbetter initially brought her
suit, the prevalence of the "continuing violation" theory may have em-
boldened Ledbetter with the belief that liability could attach to all re-
lated instances in which she could prove discrimination. As
mentioned in subsection II.B.3, however, in 2002 the Morgan decision
altered the status of the continuing violations theory in a way that
had important ramifications for Ledbetter.
1. How Morgan Changed the Field of Play
The Court's decision in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Mor-
gan16 1 meant that Ledbetter would have to conform her theory of re-
covery to the newly christened Title VII dichotomy. As mentioned in
subsection II.B.3, the Morgan Court had held that discrete acts of dis-
crimination must be alleged within the EEOC charging period in or-
der for liability to attach. 162 The Court explained that acts outside of
the charging period may provide background evidence for a timely
charge, but are not themselves actionable if time-barred. 16 3 Morgan
thus constrained the continuing violation theory to hostile work envi-
ronment claims and further held that this theory would only apply if
at least one of the component acts contributing to the hostile environ-
ment occurred within the charging period.164
No longer able to allege a continuing "serial"' 6 5 violation, Ledbet-
ter faced a hurdle that had arguably not confronted her when she orig-
inally brought her suit. She would either have to claim that each
paycheck she received that reflected past acts of discrimination was
itself a discrete act that reset the clock for purposes of filing a claim
within the charging period, or argue that discriminatory pay-setting
160. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Led-
better, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (No. 05-1074), 2006 WL 3095442.
161. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
162. Id. at 113.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 115-17.
165. See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2175 ("Morgan is perfectly clear that when an em-
ployee alleges 'serial violations,' i.e., a series of actionable wrongs, a timely EEOC
charge must be filed with respect to each discrete alleged violation.") (citing Mor-
gan, 536 U.S. at 113). Prior to Morgan, various circuit courts recognized that
certain species of "serial violation" claims fall within the limitation-tolling aus-
pices of the continuing violation theory. Examples from the Ninth Circuit include
Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1999); Green v. L.A. County Superinten-
dent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1989).
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decisions are more like the cumulative acts that make up a hostile
work environment claim.
2. Failings of "Discrete Acts" as Static Classifications
Some commentators have noted that the Court's use of discrete
acts to determine whether to apply Title VII's statute of limitations is
patently flawed.16 6 The theory of this Note, however, is that it is not
the classifications themselves that create the problem, but the Court's
potential reluctance to recognize that the same act might correctly be
thought of as discrete in some instances but not in others.
To the extent the Court has held that a discrete discriminatory act
that is easily identifiable and independently actionable must be
brought within the charging period proscribed by Title VII, it remains
faithful to the statute. However, the Court unnecessarily constrains
the remedial purpose of Title VII when it places discriminatory acts
into static classifications, and then looks at the classifications them-
selves rather than the factual context of the case in order to determine
whether the act is indeed "discrete." This approach prevents courts
from having the flexibility to apply Title VII in a way that would allow
them to remedy many more incidences of discrimination.
Ledbetter provides a good framework for analyzing the failings of
discrete acts as static classifications. The dissent presented compel-
ling policy reasons for treating pay setting decisions as related acts
comprising essentially a single claim of a hostile pay environment
rather than discrete acts.1 67 These included the fact that discrimina-
166. See, e.g., Amanda J. Zaremba, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan: The
Filing Quandary for Legally Ill-Equipped Employees and Eternally Liable Em-
ployers, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129, 1148 (2004) ("Since the Court in Morgan spent
its time simplifying the concept of a discrete act, employees are left with no gui-
dance as to which act in a series of seemingly discriminatory acts is 'indepen-
dently discriminatory' such that it will start the filing clock."). See also Leading
Cases III, Federal Statutes and Regulations B. Civil Rights Act, 116 HARv. L.
REV. 352, 359-60 (2002) ("[T]he Court failed to justify persuasively its refusal to
allow plaintiffs to invoke the continuing violations doctrine when they bring se-
rial violations claims that allege only discrete (but related) acts of discrimination
or retaliation.").
167. As Justice Ginsburg noted:
The realities of the workplace reveal why the discrimination with re-
spect to compensation that Ledbetter suffered does not fit within the cat-
egory of singular discrete acts "easy to identify." A worker knows
immediately if she is denied a promotion or transfer, if she is fired or
refused employment. And promotions, transfers, hirings, and firings are
generally public events, known to co-workers. When an employer makes
a decision of such open and definitive character, an employee can imme-
diately seek out an explanation and evaluate it for pretext. Compensa-
tion disparities, in contrast, are often hidden from sight. It is not
unusual, decisions in point illustrate, for management to decline to pub-
lish employee pay levels, or for employees to keep private their own sala-
ries. See, e.g., Goodwin v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005,
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tory pay setting decisions can be harder to identify than discrete acts
such as denial of promotion; even if a female employee learns that she
received a smaller raise than her male counterparts, she may not sus-
pect that she is being discriminated against until the smaller pay in-
creases develop into a pattern. The majority, however, determined
that under Morgan, pay setting decisions are discrete acts because
they occurred on a given day.168 The next subsection will explain that
both sides can be right, depending on the circumstances.
a. Did Morgan Preclude a "Hostile Pay Environment" Claim?
Morgan should not be understood to create an all-or-nothing world
in which employment actions are given labels such as "failure to pro-
mote" and then irrevocably cast as discrete or component actions.
16 9
Instead, courts deciding disparate pay claims that span careers should
focus on the two tests that are discernable from Morgan: 1) the ease
1008-09 (10th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff did not know what her colleagues
earned until a printout listing of salaries appeared on her desk, seven
years after her starting salary was set lower than her co-workers' sala-
ries); McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,
140 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 1998) (plaintiff worked for employer for years
before learning of salary disparity published in a newspaper). Tellingly,
as the record in this case bears out, Goodyear kept salaries confidential;
employees had only limited access to information regarding their col-
leagues' earnings.
The problem of concealed pay discrimination is particularly acute
where the disparity arises not because the female employee is flatly de-
nied a raise but because male counterparts are given larger raises. Hav-
ing received a pay increase, the female employee is unlikely to discern at
once that she has experienced an adverse employment decision. She
may have little reason even to suspect discrimination until a pattern de-
velops incrementally and she ultimately becomes aware of the disparity.
Even if an employee suspects that the reason for a comparatively low
raise is not performance but sex (or another protected ground), the
amount involved may seem too small, or the employer's intent too ambig-
uous, to make the issue immediately actionable-or winnable.
Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181-82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (foot-
note omitted).
168. Id. at 2165 (majority opinion).
169. Those who disagree might argue that once a court determines that an action such
as a pay setting decision "occurs" as the term was defined in Morgan on a given
day, that case requires that the action always be treated as discrete. This argu-
ment reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of Morgan. It was the claim it-
self, and not the component acts, that Justice Thomas declared could not be said
to "occur" on a given date. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. Clearly, each component
act that makes up a hostile environment "occurred" at a specific time, even if the
act itself was subtle or insignificant.
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with which the unlawful action can be identified,170 and 2) whether or
not the discriminatory act is actionable on its own.'17
Care should be taken at this point to stress that both of these tests
are best thought of as subjective in nature, and should therefore be
addressed from the plaintiffs perspective. They are essentially tests of
notice: (1) when did (or should) the employee identify the employment
action, and (2) when did (or should) the employee recognize the inci-
dent to be actionable on its own? 172 Under this case-specific under-
standing of Morgan, pay-setting decisions and even actions such as
failure to promote17 3 can escape classification as "discrete" if the facts
so warrant. 174 Furthermore, this understanding is not a mere rever-
sion back to the pre-Morgan "serial violation" structure because past
acts of discrimination identifiable as such will still be classified as dis-
crete and, therefore, cannot be considered for purposes of liability even
if related to timely acts.
B. Disparate Pay in the Post-Ledbetter Era
The Court in Ledbetter did not confine its opinion to an intent anal-
ysis, but expressly referred to pay-setting decisions as discrete acts. 17 5
The question thus becomes whether in doing so, the Court in Ledbetter
foreclosed the possibility of alleging pay setting decisions as compo-
nents of a hostile pay environment claim.
As mentioned in section II.C of this Note, the Court's current treat-
ment of Title VII claims constitutes a judicial compromise that has
created certain gray areas that reflect discriminatory situations not
170. See id. ("Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer,
or refusal to hire are easy to identify.").
171. Id. at 115 ("Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete
acts.... The 'unlawful employment practice' . . occurs over a series of days or
perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment
may not be actionable on its own.") (citations omitted).
172. The Court has never squarely addressed the application of the discovery rule to
discrete acts of discrimination, although Justice O'Connor stated in her concur-
ring and dissenting opinion in Morgan that she believes "that some version of the
discovery rule applies to discrete act claims." Morgan, 536 U.S. at 123 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The thesis of this Note is that the
majority opinion in Morgan did recognize a "version of the discovery rule" if the
classification of discriminatory acts are thought of as fluid, rather than static.
173. See Rendon v. AT & T Techs., 883 F.2d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[Plromotion
systems, unlike hiring systems, produce ... effects that may not manifest them-
selves as individually discriminatory except in culmination over a period of
time."); Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 402 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining
that failure to promote "invariably arises during a lengthy period of time").
174. However, certain employment actions such as failure to hire may necessarily al-
ways be classified as discrete acts because it would appear that one cannot allege
a hostile work environment if one was denied access to the environment in the
first place.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 166 and 167.
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easily reached by the remedial standards articulated in the Court's
Title VII precedent. Because disparate pay claims that span lengthy
careers fall within this gray area, attorneys who wish to bring such
claims on behalf of clients must carefully navigate the pitfalls that
abound in order to avoid having large portions a client's cause of ac-
tion time barred. This subsection will provide a roadmap for bringing
such claims.
Like Justice Brennan's now-infamous "paycheck accrual" quote in
Bazemore,1 76 Justice Alito's pronouncement in Ledbetter that "a pay-
setting decision is a discrete act that occurs at a particular point in
time"17 7 is highly susceptible to misinterpretation if read in a vacuum.
Potential litigants may assume that, to the extent components of their
discrimination claim involve past pay-setting decisions, these deci-
sions will be automatically and unequivocally time-barred. This was
not the holding in Ledbetter, however. Like Bazemore, context must
be added in order to gain an accurate understanding. Read together,
Morgan and Ledbetter leave open the possibility of a "hostile pay envi-
ronment" claim.
1. Hostile Pay Environment: The Individual Plaintiff
Morgan provides a framework for classifying disparate treatment
claims for purposes of calculating Title VII's limitations period, but
nothing in Morgan compels a finding that if a discriminatory act is
discrete in one context, it can never be considered as a component part
of a hostile work environment claim in another context.178 Ledbetter
was not to the contrary. As the Court pointed out, Ledbetter alleged
that the payment of each paycheck constituted a separate violation of
Title VII.179 Although the dissent argued as an afterthought that
pay-setting decisions were more like hostile work environment claims,
Ledbetter failed to commit fully to this theory in her brief to the
Court.180 Additionally, Ledbetter's failure to allege a timely act of in-
tentional discrimination effectively precluded her from prevailing on a
hostile work environment theory even if Ledbetter had zealously pur-
sued such a claim. Therefore, Justice Alito's statement that "a pay
setting decision is a discrete act that occurs at a particular point in
time" must be read in the context of his subsequent observation that
"what Ledbetter alleged was not a single wrong consisting of a succes-
176. See supra note 138.
177. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.
178. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). Morgan provides
examples of discrete actions as noted in subsection II.B.3, but the language of the
opinion does not indicate that the list is either exhaustive or static. Because the
examples listed were not directly before the Court in Morgan, they are perhaps
best thought of as dicta.
179. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2175.
180. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 129.
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sion of acts... [instead, she alleged a series of discrete discriminatory
acts . . . each of which was independently identifiable and
actionable ...."1s
Thus, the majority in Ledbetter did not hold that an individual
plaintiff could never bring a hostile pay environment claim. They sim-
ply held that Ledbetter had not alleged such a claim. In other words,
while it is arguable that Ledbetter may have refined the holding of
Morgan by holding that discriminatory acts recognizable as discrete
cannot make up the component parts of a hostile work environment
claim, ' 8 2 neither Morgan nor Ledbetter directly held that an act iden-
tifiable as discrete in one factual context must always be character-
ized as discrete in other factual contexts.
Future plaintiffs wishing to bring hostile pay environment claims
should therefore track the language of the two Morgan tests faithfully
in their pleadings, taking care to allege that the component pay deci-
sions were not easily identifiable as either discriminatory or actiona-
ble until their repetitious nature made them so. The plaintiff must
also be certain that at least one of the component pay-setting decisions
occurred within the charging period.
2. Hostile Pay Environment: Pattern-or-Practice Claims
Attentive attorneys who wish to bring hostile pay environment
claims on behalf of their client may agree that the door has not been
expressly closed by Ledbetter, yet still perceive a pattern in the Court's
treatment of Title VII that makes them justifiably hesitant about
181. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2175.
182. This question had been left open by Morgan, as one commentator noted:
The... majority's decision [in Morgan] to let individuals invoke the con-
tinuing violations doctrine for hostile environment claims will simply
lead employees to couch their claims in hostile environment terms. This
will often be possible because the dichotomy that the Court creates be-
tween hostile environment claims and discrete acts claims is a false one,
in that the two are often intertwined. Plaintiffs, that is, frequently con-
tend that discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation contributed to the
hostile environment. ... Unless the courts are prepared to bar plaintiffs
who allege hostile environment from pointing to discrete acts of discrimi-
nation, the actual result of... [Morgan] may thus be the approval of the
continuing violations theory in most or all serial violation cases.
Leading Cases III, supra note 166, at 360-61 (footnotes omitted). While Ledbet-
ter may have appeared to resolve this question, it is again noteworthy that the
majority in Ledbetter determined that a hostile environment claim was not before
them. As such, there is at least a good argument that discrete acts can be consid-
ered as component parts of a hostile environment claim. Further support for this
idea comes from the fact that in Morgan, the Ninth Circuit relied on many of the
discrete acts alleged by Morgan in determining that the continuing violations
theory applied to Morgan's hostile environment claim, and the Supreme Court
affirmed that Morgan's hostile environment claim was timely. See id. n.77.
2008]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:955
their client's chances of success. 183 Such an attorney may wish to pro-
ceed on a pattern-or-practice theory; for, as will be shown, the Court
has already implicitly (and perhaps unwittingly) approved of hostile
pay environment pattern-or-practice claims.
As mentioned in subsection II.A.3 of this Note, in a pattern-or-
practice case, the individual plaintiff or plaintiffs usually allege indi-
vidual disparate treatment claims, but then bring a class action as-
serting that the employer's disparate treatment of the plaintiffs is the
result of an organization-wide "pattern-or-practice" of intentional dis-
criminatory treatment. When the Morgan Court split the world of Ti-
tle VII cases in two, it expressly declined to determine whether the
rule it announced applied to pattern-or-practice claims brought by pri-
vate litigants.18 4 Thus, the question as to whether the continuing vio-
lation theory applied to pattern-or-practice cases remained an open
issue at the time Ledbetter was decided.
Ledbetter did not decide the issue directly because the claim
brought was not styled as a pattern-or-practice claim. However, the
Court in Ledbetter did give a nod of approval to its prior decision in
Bazemore. As previously mentioned, Bazemore was a disparate pay
action wherein the petitioners alleged that the respondents had devel-
oped and continued a pattern of paying blacks less than whites.18 5
The petitioner, the United States, further argued "that the continued
intentional payment of discriminatory salaries to blacks constitutes a
continuing violation of Title VII."186
183. As Bob Dylan would say, "You don't need a weatherman to know which way the
wind blows." BOB DYLAN, Subterranean Homesick Blues, on BRINGING IT ALL
BACK HOME (Columbia Records 1965).
184. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 n.9 (2002) ("We have no occasion here to consider the
timely filing question with respect to 'pattern-or-practice' claims brought by pri-
vate litigants as none are at issue here.").
185. See supra subection II.B.2.
186. Reply Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 3-4, Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385
(1986) (Nos. 85-93, 85-428) 1986 WL 728217, stating:
We argue simply that the continued intentional payment of discrimina-
tory salaries to blacks constitutes a continuing violation of Title VII. If
amici AFL-CIO intend to suggest that a racially neutral policy (dealing,
for example, with promotions or incentive bonuses), consistently applied
since the enactment of Title VII, constitutes a "present violation" of the
Act, simply because policies previously followed placed blacks in a less
advantageous position and they have failed to "catch up," we seriously
disagree. Such an analysis would be directly contrary to the rule that
Title VII imposes on the employer no responsibility to eliminate a prac-
tice which "gives present effect to a past act of discrimination." United
Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977). For, if a nondiscrimina-
tory failure to correct the continuing effects of pre-Act discrimination
constituted a "present violation" of Title VII, then the employer who dis-
criminated on the basis of sex before 1972 in Evans would have commit-
ted a "present violation" by refusing to alter the "victim's" seniority, and
the employer in Hazelwood who discriminated in hiring before the Act
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In a post-Morgan world, the Ledbetter Court's approval of
Bazemore can mean one of two things. First, it could mean that the
dichotomy announced in Morgan has no application to pattern-or-
practice claims. Indeed, because plaintiffs in pattern-or-practice cases
seek to impose liability by claiming that the practice of discrimination
is an employer's unannounced standard operating procedure, it would
make little sense to bar from consideration untimely discrete acts that
merely act as components of the claim.
However, the Ledbetter Court's approval of Bazemore could be in-
terpreted under the assumption that the dichotomy announced in
Morgan applies to pattern-or-practice cases in the same way it applies
to all other Title VII disparate treatment actions. If this is the case,
however, then Ledbetter's apparent approval of the application of the
continuing violation theory in Bazemore implicitly recognizes a "hos-
tile pay environment claim," because a continuing violation theory can
only be recognized in claims of hostile work environment in the post-
Morgan era. 1 8 7
Thus, plaintiffs who feel they have been subjected to discrimina-
tory pay setting decisions throughout their careers must style their
claims carefully in order to have the entire discriminatory period con-
sidered. To increase their chances of success, they should allege that
the discriminatory pay setting decisions represent a practice that did
not manifest itself in a way that was identifiable or actionable until
enough pay setting decisions passed for a discernable pattern to
emerge. They should also allege that component discriminatory deci-
sions were made within the charging period. If possible, other mem-
bers of the plaintiffs protected class should be joined, or certified as a
class, in order to bolster proof of a firm-wide pattern-or-practice.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held in Ledbetter that time-barred past acts of
intentional discrimination do not become actionable each time their
effects are felt. Thus, the decision to offer a discriminatory wage, and
not the actual payment of the wage by a facially neutral pay system,
determines when the action occurs for purposes of Title VII. This is so
because to hold otherwise would thwart the Court's present-intent re-
quirement in disparate treatment cases. Although the Court could
have disposed of Ledbetter's case without determining how pay-set-
ting decisions should be classified after Morgan, the Court held that
such acts are properly characterized as discrete acts that must be
necessarily would have been in "present violation" to the extent it had
not remedied the pre-Act discrimination.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
187. See supra subsections II.B.3, IV.A.1.
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brought within the EEOC charging period. To the extent the Court in
Ledbetter made a static classification of pay setting decisions as dis-
crete acts, its interpretation of Morgan was unnecessarily narrow and
offensive to the remedial purpose of Title VII.
However, a close reading of Ledbetter indicates that the Court may
have confined this holding to the particular facts and allegations of
the case, leaving open the possibility that pay-setting decisions that
span careers can still be challenged for liability purposes under a hos-
tile pay environment theory. Such hostile pay environment claims
have not been expressly foreclosed by any of the Court's Title VII cases
and have been implicitly recognized in pattern-or-practice cases. Fur-
thermore, if determined on a case-by-case basis, such claims could
overcome unnecessary judicial constraints and allow Title VII to reach
its full remedial potential.
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